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Southern Ocean” (2007) 11 Antarctic and Southern Ocean Law and Policy 1-37) 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The right of hot pursuit has a long history in the international law of the sea. It was 
codified in Article 23 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas
1
 (High Seas 
Convention) and was adopted virtually unaltered in Article 111 of the United Nations 
Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC).
2
  Whilst this heritage gives the doctrine 
legitimacy, yet it is also restrictive, for although the right as articulated in the High 
Seas Convention has remained unchanged for the past 50 years, the environment in 
which maritime operations are conducted has been dramatically transformed. This is 
particularly the case in the context of marine capture fisheries.
3
 
 
Global catch levels and world trade in fish and fish products continue to increase 
whilst the majority of fish stocks remain classified as fully exploited to over 
exploited.
4
  Illegal Fishing
5
 in coastal State waters is a constant and serious threat to 
coastal State sovereignty and effective marine resource management. Like other 
aspects of our lives, the fishing industry has benefitted from industrial and 
technological innovation such as state of the art communications systems, GPS 
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 Geneva Convention on the High Seas (1958) (opened for signature 29 April 1958) 450 UNTS 82, 
entry into force 30 November 1962. 
2 Article 111 is almost identical to Article 23, except that it allowed the right of hot pursuit from the 
EEZ as well as the continental shelf. Article 23 of the Geneva Convention did not address hot pursuit 
from the EEZ or the continental shelf, and as such, a right of hot pursuit from these areas did not exist 
under customary international law at that time. 
3
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4
State of the World Fisheries and Aquaculture (2008) Part 1, 7.  “An overall review of the state of 
marine fishery resources confirms that the proportions of overexploited, depleted and recovering stocks 
have remained relatively stable in the last 10–15 years.”   Particularly worrisome is the statement that: 
“ Most of the stocks of the top ten species, which together account for about 30 percent of world 
marine capture fisheries production in terms of quantity, are fully exploited or overexploited.” 
5
 Illegal fishing is a subset of IUU fishing (Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated). In the context of this 
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fishing will be used. IUU fishing is defined in the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and 
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th
 session of the 
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systems and satellite radios are common place on illegal fishing vessels.
6
 Those 
seeking financial gain through illegal fishing can easily take advantage of these 
developments to stay one step ahead of coastal authorities.  
 
Illegal fishing has graduated from an opportunistic venture to one that is planned and 
often centrally organised.
7
 There is also evidence of organised corporate backing of 
some illegal fishing ventures.
8
  Yet the tools with which coastal States are equipped to 
address the increasing incidence of illegal fishing have not changed, indeed, they have 
become blunted through years of combating the ever evolving illegal fishing industry. 
This is because any action taken by coastal States must be consistent with their 
obligations under the LOSC and illegal fishers know full well the limitations such 
compliance entails.  
 
An uneasy balance was struck during the long negotiations of the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea between the rights of coastal and long 
distance fishing States. 
9
  It is argued that circumstances have changed dramatically 
and that balance needs recasting. As Judge ad hoc Shearer noted, albeit in a dissenting 
opinion, in the Volga case:  
 
But it should be recognised that circumstances have now 
changed.  Few fishing vessels are state-owned.  The problems 
today arise from privately owned fishing vessels, often 
operating in fleets, pursuing rich rewards in illegal fishing and 
in places where detection is often difficult.  Fishing companies 
are highly capitalised and efficient, and some of them are 
unscrupulous.  The flag State is bound to exercise effective 
control of its vessels, but this is often made difficult by 
frequent changes of name and flag by those vessels.  It is 
notable that in recent cases before the Tribunal, including the 
present case, although the flag State has been represented by a 
State agent, the main burden of presentation of the case has 
been borne by private lawyers retained by the vessel‟s owners.  
A new “balance” has to be struck between vessel owners, 
operators and fishing companies on the one hand, and coastal 
States on the other.
10
 
 
Revisiting the right of hot pursuit? 
 
The aim of this paper is to examine recent State practice (mainly by Australia) in the 
exercise of hot pursuit in the Southern Ocean. During the late 1990s and early 21
st
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  For example, when the South Tomi was boarded in 2001 by Australian authorities there was 
evidence that the vessel‟s Master had  received advice from the vessel owners on the conduct of the 
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9
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 The Volga Case (Russian Federation v Australia)  No. 11, ITLOS 23 December 2002, Judge ad hoc 
Shearer, dissenting opinion.  
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century, the waters falling under CCAMLR‟s area of application were inundated with 
illegal fishers. Enforcement action, within coastal State maritime zones, in the vast 
and inhospitable Southern Ocean was problematic. Three of the longest hot pursuits 
on record were conducted by Australia, two of which were successfully concluded.
11
 
Several aspects of those pursuits warrant further analysis as they illustrate the very 
forceful manner in which illegal fishing ventures are now conducted and the 
limitations a strict and literal application of Article 111 has on the ability of coastal 
States to deter illegal fishers.  
 
This paper also suggests what might be done, within the framework of international 
law, to assist coastal States in their battle with illegal fishing.  In this context, it is 
noted that as long as twenty years ago, authors acknowledged that the right of hot 
pursuit needed modernising to adapt to the current fishing environment. Allen stated: 
 
[S]ome elements of the traditional doctrine of hot pursuit are largely founded 
on  assumptions better suited to the era of „local fisheries, three-mile territorial 
seas, and observation by long glass than to the current era characterised by 
distant-water fleets of factory trawlers, 200-mile exclusive economic zones, 
and observation by radar, aerial photography, underwater sensors, and 
satellites.
12
   
 
The same author posed a number of questions which, though still unresolved, are of 
significant importance. These questions, the first two of which are raised in the facts 
of the hot pursuit of the Viarsa by Australian vessel the Southern Supporter in 2003, 
are:  
 
 Can radio signals be used to give the required order to stop? 
 Can radar be used to track vessels not subject to visual observation? 
 Can high altitude aircraft or satellites keeping vessels under continuous 
observation satisfy this requirement of hot pursuit?
13
 
 
To address these questions one needs to appreciate the framework within which the 
right of hot pursuit sits before then examining State practice.   The central questions 
considered in this paper are: (1) has the actual exercise of the right become so 
hamstrung by the prescriptive and cumulative requirements of Article 111 of the 
LOSC that in the current maritime environment it is little more than a hollow promise 
of coastal State authority? Further,: (2) has State practice in the pursuit and arrest of 
illegal fishing vessels been sufficient to bring a new understanding of (and agreement 
on)  how the right may be exercised?        
 
 
The right of hot pursuit under the international law of the sea 
 
The right of hot pursuit is based upon principles of customary international law.
14
  It 
represents an exception to the principle of exclusive flag State jurisdiction on the high 
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seas. It enables coastal States to enforce their laws upon the commission of an offence 
and to continue to pursue the offending vessel beyond coastal State maritime zones. 
As this represents an impingement upon  flag State sovereignty, there are a number of 
procedural conditions to be satisfied in the valid exercise of hot pursuit. These are 
listed in Article 111 of the LOSC.   
 
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has stated that these “conditions for 
the exercise of the right of hot pursuit…are cumulative. Each of them has to be 
satisfied for the pursuit to be legitimate under the Convention.” 15  These conditions 
are examined in detail further below.  
 
The right of hot pursuit and fisheries enforcement  
 
In relation to fisheries management the right of hot pursuit is generally linked to a 
violation of a Coastal State fisheries law. In the enforcement of its fisheries laws, 
Australia has been involved in three of the longest hot pursuits on record.
16
 Two of 
these pursuits resulted in successful boarding‟s but they have not been without 
controversy.    
 
In a 2004 speech to commemorate the passing of ten years since UNCLOS entered 
into force, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs announced that the Australian 
Government was working toward a 21
st
 century definition of „Hot Pursuit‟.17  This 
speech was made at a time when the practicalities of exercising the right of hot pursuit 
were under close scrutiny and was possibly more about political posturing than actual 
conduct for there has been no direct action taken to further Australia‟s position. The 
central  issue, according to the Minister, was applying the doctrine of hot pursuit in a 
modern context. That is, by taking into account satellite-based and other remote 
sensing technologies to enable both the identification and pursuit of „illegal vessels‟.18 
This sentiment echoes the questions posed by Allen in 1989.  
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 Nicholas Poulantzas, The Right of Hot Pursuit in International Law (2002, 2
nd
 edition) 39-40 and 
generally Chapter II.  
15
 M/V Saiga Case (No.2) (St Vincent and the Grenadines v Guinea) ITLOS Case No.2. 1 July 1999, 
paragraph 146.  
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 See Table 1 below.  
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 The Hon. Alexander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs, University of Sydney Symposium 
„Strategic Directions for Australia and the Law of the Sea, 16 November 2004 at 
www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2004/041116_unclos.html) 
18
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Table 1: Hot Pursuits conducted by Australia  
 
Vessel Date Length of 
Pursuit 
Outcome Nature of 
Assistance 
 
South Tomi 
 
 
April 
2001 
 
3,300 n miles 
(14 days) 
 
 
Vessel arrested 320 
n miles south of 
Cape Town 
(outside South 
African EEZ) and 
escorted back to 
Fremantle, 
Australia  
 
 
Australian military 
personnel boarded 
via South African 
military vessels  
 
 
Lena 
 
 
February 
2002 
 
14 days 
 
Vessel escaped 
arrest in December 
2001. Southern 
Supporter ran low 
on fuel. Vessel 
boarded on 
subsequent sighting 
in February 2002.   
 
 
 
none 
 
Viarsa 
 
 
August 
2003 
 
3,900 n miles 
(21 days) 
 
 
Vessel arrested 
2000n miles south 
west of Cape Town 
and escorted back 
to Fremantle, 
Australia.  
 
 
Support provided 
by South African 
officers on board 
South African tug 
the John Ross and 
UK fisheries patrol 
vessel, Dorada and 
South African ice 
breaker, Agulhas  
 
 
 
Satisfying the elements of hot pursuit 
 
One of the fundamental requirements is that the pursuit be „hot‟ or immediate.19 That 
is, the pursuit commences immediately upon the commission of an offence. The basis 
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 In civil law countries the term in flagrante delicto (in the very act) is an analogous concept. The 
term „fresh‟ has also been used.   
 6 
of allowing a pursuit is to place the alleged offender in the same position as if he had 
been arrested at the time of the commission of the offence.
20
 
 
In addition to the requirement that the pursuit be immediate, the wording of Article 
111 identifies a number of preconditions for the valid exercise of the right.  These are:  
 
 the coastal State must have good reason to believe that the vessel has violated 
the laws and regulations of that State;
21
 
 
 the hot pursuit must be commenced when the foreign vessel is within the 
internal waters, archipelagic waters, territorial sea, EEZ or contiguous zone of 
that coastal State;
22
 
 
 the hot pursuit must not be interrupted;23 
 
 the right of hot pursuit ceases upon the vessel entering the territorial sea of its 
own State or/of a third State;
24
 
 
 hot pursuit can only be commenced after a visual or auditory signal to stop has 
been given at a distance which enables it to be seen or heard by the foreign 
ship;
25
  and 
 
 hot pursuit can only be exercised by warships or authorised government 
vessel, which are clearly marked and identifiable.
26
  
 
These preconditions are discussed further below, some immediately below and others 
under „Challenges for coastal States‟.  
 
Good Reason   
Article 111(1) requires there be „good reason to believe‟ that a vessel has violated the 
laws of the State. This wording was adopted by the International Law Commission 
(ILC) in 1956 and is understood to provide for a distinction between a certainty that 
an offence has been committed and a mere suspicion.  Hence „good reason to believe‟ 
is founded upon strong indications and not on mere suspicion or suppositions that an 
offence has been committed.
27
  
 
In the context of modern marine fisheries, there is sometimes a strong desire by 
authorities to deter all illegal foreign fishers by adopting a hard line with respect to 
enforcement. Is the mere sighting of a foreign fishing vessel with fish on board within 
the Australian EEZ enough for there to be „good reason to believe‟ that the vessel has 
engaged in fishing without a licence or is simply exercising a right of innocent 
                                                 
20
 Glanville Williams, The Juridical Basis of Hot Pursuit, (1939) 20 British Year book of International 
Law 84.   
21
 LOSC, Article 111(1). 
22
 LOSC, Article 111(1) and (2).  
23
 LOSC, Article 111(1).  
24
 LOSC, Article 111(3). 
25
 LOSC, Article 111(1) and (4).  
26
 LOSC, Article 111 (5).  
27
 Poulantzas, above n. 14, 156-657. 
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passage loaded with fish caught on the high seas? The vessel may be equipped to fish 
without a licence, itself an offence under the Fisheries Management Act (1991) Cth.  
  
Consider the acquittal of five fishers onboard the Viarsa when she was apprehended. 
They had been charged with illegally fishing within the AFZ. Upon the acquittal, the 
Defence counsel were reported as saying: „the authorities had not seen the men 
fishing in the Australian fishing zone and the case had been based entirely upon 
circumstantial   evidence.‟28  The acquittal for fisheries offences does not translate to 
the absence of a „good reason‟ to believe the Viarsa had committed an offence. It 
might be argued that one does not sail into a high sea state some 4000 kilometres from 
the nearest port for a pleasure cruise. There was also evidence from crown witnesses 
that crew aboard the fleeing vessel threw nets and fish overboard during the pursuit, 
blacked out the vessels name and number making identification difficult.
29
 
 
Nevertheless the case does illustrates the point that persons accused of illegal fishing 
can be expected to test all of the evidence. It would however be highly undesirable to 
rely upon an acquittal to question the judgement of the fisheries officer (acting for the 
coastal State) in assessing that there was „good reason‟ to believe there has been an 
offence committed. Article 111 requires only that there is „good reason to believe‟, 
not, that the officer is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt.   In any case Article 111 
does contain provision for the compensation of the vessel should the pursuit be 
proven to have been unlawful.
30
 
 
In the M/V Saiga case, ITLOS  considered the conditions to be satisfied for a valid hot 
pursuit and found a number had not been met. In relation to the requirement that there 
be a „good reason‟ to believe the laws of the coastal State had been violated,  the 
Tribunal held that on the basis of information available to them, the Guinean 
authorities could not have had more than a suspicion a tanker has violated the laws of  
Guinea in the EEZ.
31
 
 
The matter of a „good reason‟ has been elaborated upon in the 2007 treaty between 
France and Australia on cooperative surveillance and enforcement within their 
respective maritime zones in the Southern Ocean.
32
 The parties agreed upon the 
following conditions for the exercise of hot pursuit. 
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 Amanda Banks, „$30 m claim after fishers freed‟ The Australian, 7 November 2005 ,4. 
29
 Mark Philips, „Fish Poachers show colours‟ The Herald Sun, 25 August 2003, 15.   
30
 Article 111(8), LOSC. 
31
M/V Saiga, above n.15, paragraph 146. See also the Separate Opinion of Judge Anderson where he 
states: “Secondly, the evidence produced…discloses no more than suspicions on the part of the patrol 
vessels at 0400 hours on 28 October 1997.  A suspicion is something less than the “good reason to 
believe” required by paragraph 1 of article 111.  The Customs document PV29 contained much 
information concerning the bunkering of the three fishing vessels which was first obtained from the 
Saiga's log book and the questioning of the Master.  From a reading of the terms of the judgments 
handed down by the two criminal courts in Conakry, much of the evidence produced in the proceedings 
against the Master of the Saiga was obtained only after the arrest of the ship, thereby putting in doubt 
the existence before that time of sufficient information to amount to “a good reason to believe”.” 
32
 Agreement on the Cooperative Enforcement of Fisheries Laws between the Government of Australia 
and the Government of the French Republic in the Maritime Areas Adjacent to the French Southern 
and Antarctic Territories and Heard and McDonald Islands, Paris 8 January 2007. Not yet in force. 
[2007] ATNIF 1.   
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Article 4 
 
2.  Hot pursuit may be commenced upon fulfilling the following 
conditions:  
 
a. the authorities of the relevant Party have good reason to believe that the 
fishing vessel or one of its boats has violated the laws of the Party within 
whose maritime zone the vessel is detected. The basis for such belief may 
include:  
 
i. direct visual contact with the fishing vessel or one of its boats by the 
authorised vessel; or  
 
ii. evidence obtained by or on behalf of the authorised vessel by technical 
means; and  
 
 
b.  a clear signal to stop has been given to the fishing vessel by or on 
behalf of the authorised vessel which enables it to be seen or heard by the 
fishing vessel.  
 
The treaty contemplates that evidence may be gathered through technical means 
which would include aerial surveillance photography, radar or satellite imagery of a 
vessel which can show not only location but tracking consistent with fishing or 
collecting lines.  Whilst such evidence may satisfy the Treaty provisions and possibly 
Article 111, it is less clear that the requisite standard of proof for domestic offences 
would be met.  
 
Breach of coastal state law   
The laws and regulations alleged to have been violated must be within the scope and 
sovereignty of the coastal State to legislate.  For example, there is no coastal State 
jurisdiction over criminal offences beyond the breadth of the territorial sea and as 
such a murder on board a foreign flagged ship within the Australian EEZ does not 
give rise to the right of hot pursuit under Article 111.
33
  
 
With respect to fisheries regulation, coastal States have jurisdiction to 200 n. miles so 
the satisfaction of this requirement would appear, on its face, to be straightforward.  
However, frequently there are evidentiary issues surrounding the location of the 
vessel at the time of sighting for illegal vessels tend to „sit‟ on the 200 n. mile line and 
move inside when safe to do so.  
 
With the extension of some coastal States‟ continental shelves34  consideration of the 
rights they have in relation to these areas is required.  There is no fisheries jurisdiction 
attached to the extended continental shelf. However, what are the rights of the coastal 
                                                 
33
 If the murdered person is an Australian citizen, jurisdiction over the alleged murder would be 
asserted on the basis of the nationality principle and the flag State would be requested to hand the 
accused over to Australian authorities. 
34
 Australia‟s claim to an extended continental shelf  was accepted by the United Nations‟ Commission 
on the limits of the Continental Shelf  in April 2008.  
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State in relation to vessels breaching laws relating  to oil and gas exploration in the 
extended continental shelf? Article 111 (2) states that: 
 
The right of hot pursuit shall apply mutatis mutandis to violations in 
the exclusive economic zone or on the continental shelf, including safety 
zones around continental shelf installations, of the laws and regulations of the 
coastal State applicable in accordance with this Convention to the exclusive 
economic zone or the continental shelf, including such safety zones. 
 
Hence it would seem that the right of hot pursuit would apply with respect to offences 
related to the extended continental shelf.  
 
Commencement within the coastal State zone 
The pursuit must be commenced whilst the vessel is still within the relevant coastal 
State zone. Establishing this as a matter of fact is not without problems. 
 
During the hearing of charges against the Fishing Master of the South Tomi, the 
Crown submitted that the Master had been given a valid direction under section 
84(1)(k)(ii) of the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) to proceed to the port of 
Fremantle.
35
  The Senior Magistrate found (after hearing evidence from the accused 
that the order was simply to proceed to port) that the direction given was not a 
direction for the purposes of the Act and acquitted the Master of the charge of failing 
to obey a lawful direction of a fisheries officer pursuant to section 108 of the 
Fisheries Management Act.
36
 The consequence of this finding is that it is arguable that 
the South Tomi did not receive any directions from the Southern Supporter whilst 
within the Heard and MacDonald Islands‟ EEZ.  Indeed it was argued that it was not 
until the South Tomi  was outside the EEZ that the Southern Supporter advised the 
vessel of its intention to engage in pursuit.
37
  
 
A weak argument may be possible on the facts that there was no commencement of 
the pursuit until after the South Tomi left the Australian EEZ, by virtue of the fact that 
the order to stop was not given and hence one of the cumulative requirements of the 
right is not met. Such a conclusion however, runs counter to the intent behind the 
right of hot pursuit, which is to enable the coastal State to exercise its jurisdiction 
against offending vessels which flee the jurisdiction. Without such a right the State 
becomes powerless to exercise its jurisdiction. As Lauterpacht observed, absent the 
right of hot pursuit: “the enforcement by the State of its protective jurisdiction within 
its territorial waters tends to become nugatory.”38 It would therefore defeat the 
purpose of the right to accept the argument that the pursuit did not commence within 
the Australian EEZ simply because whilst within the EEZ the offending vessel did not 
indicate  an intention to flee.     
 
                                                 
35
 James Marissen, Hot Pursuit on No Pursuit? The F.V. South Tomi Arrest in 2001, (2002) 16 
Australian and New Zealand Maritime Law Journal  66. 
36
 O’Dea v Aviles, unreported, Court of Petty Sessions of Western Australia,  Cicchini SM, 18 
September 2001. 
37
 Marissen, above n.35, 76. 
38
 Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law: being the collected papers of Hersch Lauterpacht  (edited by 
Elihu Lauterpacht) 1977, 173.   
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A more troublesome matter to the Australian authorities in the South Tomi pursuit was 
satisfying the requirement that a visual or auditory signal to stop has been given at a 
distance which enables it to be seen or heard by the foreign ship.   
 
Visual or auditory signal to stop 
The LOSC clearly states that the signal is to be visual or auditory and to be given at a 
distance that enables the signal to be seen or heard by the foreign ship. In an age of 
technology which has created a wide range of communications techniques, is this 50 
year old requirement too restrictive?   
 
In 1956 before the adoption of the text for the High Seas Convention, the ILC did 
consider the use of signals, via radio, to communicate the order to stop to an 
offending vessel. However, at the time it was considered that in order to prevent 
abuse, orders via the radio would not be permitted as they could be given at great 
distance and transmitted by wireless.
39
 This is thought to be because the ILC was 
concerned there may be no limit on the distance from which a signal may be given.
40
  
Of interest, the ILC also noted that same year that: „the important point was the 
fundamental right to give the order to stop and to undertake hot pursuit, not the 
specific means by which the right was exercised.
41
  
 
The use of radio broadcasts to signal the order to stop has been judicially considered. 
In the M/V Saiga case, Justice Anderson considered the use of radio signals in his 
separate opinion.   His comments are worth quoting in their entirety.  
 
 
  […article 111, paragraph 1, requires that an order to stop must be received 
before pursuit begins.  Even if the Tribunal had been willing in principle (and 
after due consideration of the point) to consider the possibility of accepting as 
an auditory signal a radio message sent over a distance of 40 miles or so, the 
alleged signal from P328 could still not have been deemed to constitute a 
valid signal in the absence of any evidence of: (1) the sending of the message 
from P328 (e.g. a recording on board P328 or an entry in its log book setting 
out the text of the order and the time of its transmission); and (2) more 
importantly, the receipt of the message by the Saiga and the latter’s 
understanding of the message as an order to stop by officials of Guinea (e.g. 
from the Saiga’s tape recordings of its incoming radio traffic or an entry in its 
log book).  Moreover, there was other evidence which tended to show that, far 
from having received any intimation of the approach of the patrol vessels, the 
Saiga was taken completely by surprise by their arrival, whilst drifting outside 
Guinea’s EEZ, over four hours after the time of the alleged signal.  In the 
circumstances, the Judgment in paragraph 151 rightly concludes that there 
was insufficient evidence to establish that an order was given and received.
42
   
 
 
                                                 
39
 (1956) Volume II, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol II, 285. 
40
 Allen, above n.12, 319 (see n.148).  
41
 [1956] Year Book of the International Law Commission, Vol 1, 54 
42
 M/V Saiga above n.16, Separate Opinion of Justice Anderson.   
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These comments may be explained in part by the particular circumstances of the 
Saiga case as alluded to in the above quote. The International Tribunal for the Law of 
the Sea (ITLOS) found that there was an unnecessary use of force against the vessel 
from St Vincent and the Grenadines.
43
   
 
Some authors have commented that the requirements of Article 111(4) act to place 
“an increased burden on the pursing vessel.”44 On some occasions coastal States have 
argued that the need to give a signal to stop is obviated by the offending vessels‟ 
decision to flee the jurisdiction.
45
  Others submit that the type or kind of signal is 
unimportant as long as the arresting vessel arrives in time.
46
 This is consistent with 
the decision of the English Court in R v. Mills in which it was held that the use of 
VHF radio to issue the signal to stop was sufficient when used in conjunction with a 
hovering helicopter.
47
  The 2007 treaty between France and Australia supports the 
interpretation that it is enough that the signal is clear and can be seen or heard by the 
fishing vessel.
48
  
 
The turn of the 21
ST
 century has seen significant increases in illegal fishing in coastal 
zones throughout the world. There are now forceful arguments to be put supporting 
the use of radio signals to communicate an order to stop, to an illegal foreign fishing 
vessel. These arguments include enabling the coastal State vessel to commence the 
hot pursuit of a vessel which flees before it has come within visual or auditory 
range.
49
 The underlying aim of the ILC in 1956 and the intent of Article 111, is that 
the signal be given at a distance which enables it to be seen or heard. The rationale 
being that there is no surprise for the vessel when a coastal patrol vessel closes in on 
it. In 1956 and to a lesser extent in 1982, the means of communication were more 
limited and less reliable. Radio signals can now be effectively given at some distance 
and a record of the signal, date, time and distance at which it was sent, and the 
frequency over which it was sent, can be kept by the coastal State as proof of 
compliance with this requirement.  
 
The communication to the Volga by Australian naval personnel illustrates the 
complexities of the modern fisheries environment and the challenges in meeting the 
requirement to issue the order to stop whilst the fishing vessel is still within the 
coastal State EEZ.  Evidence was put before J. French of the Australian Federal Court 
that the order to stop was actually given after the Volga had exited the EEZ.
50
   In fact, 
counsel for Olbers submitted that “at no time prior to boarding did the helicopter or 
any Australian military ship require or order the vessel to stop in the AFZ, nor did the 
vessel receive any communication from the helicopter or from any Australian military 
ship.”51 The Australian Federal Court held that the vessel was forfeited to the 
                                                 
43
 M/V Saiga Case (No.2) (St Vincent and the Grenadines v Guinea) ITLOS Case No.2. 1 July 1999, 
paragraph 159.  
44
 John Colombus, The International Law of the Sea, (1962 5
th
 ed) 154. 
45
 In 1989 a Polish vessel , the Wlocznik, was apprehended off the Alaskan coast even though it fled the 
US EEZ before the Coast Guard cutter could give the signal to stop. See Allen, above n 8, 319, note 
142.   
46
 M.S.McDougal and W.T.Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans, 1962, 897.  
47
 R v Mills and Others (Unreported Judgement of the Croydon Crown Court, Devonshire J) 1995  
48
 2007 France/Australia Treaty Article 4.2.b. 
49
 Allen, above n.12, 323. 
50
 Olbers Co Ltd v. Commonwealth of Australia (2004) 136 FCR 67, per French J, paragraph 31.  
51
 Ibid.  
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Commonwealth by the operation of s106A of the Fisheries Management Act 1991 and 
accordingly found that arguments in relation to the validity of boarding were not 
relevant.
52
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
The validity of the hot pursuit was raised by Russia, the flag State of the Volga, 
during proceedings before ITLOS for prompt relief.
53
 The factual matters raised to 
challenge the pursuit under domestic law were aired before the Tribunal. The 
Australian government‟s position was that the „order to stop‟ requirement was 
satisfied by the broadcast from the naval helicopter that the Volga was about to be 
boarded. It was argued that stopping was an implicit requirement of cooperating with 
the boarding. In relation to the argument that the broadcast was made when the Volga 
was beyond the EEZ, Australia argued that the premise of the right of hot pursuit 
would be undermined if an otherwise lawful hot pursuit were held to be unlawful 
because of a mistaken but reasonable determination of the precise location of a 
vessel.
54
  
 
Continuous and uninterrupted pursuit 
Article 111 requires that the pursuit be continuous and uninterrupted. The term 
„interrupted‟ has not been defined in the LOSC however a substantial interruption 
such as diverting the pursuing vessel from the path of pursuit to attend a vessel in 
distress call would seem to qualify as an „interruption‟. This occurred when the Lena 
was being pursued by a fisheries patrol vessel in 2001.  The patrol vessel was forced 
to break off the pursuit to attend a nearby SOS call which later proved to be false 
when no vessel in distress could be found in the vicinity.
55
   
 
Under the Fisheries Management Act the pursuit of a person or boat is not taken to be 
terminated or substantially interrupted only because the officer concerned loses sight 
of the person or boat. Section 87(3) further provides that this includes the loss of radar 
signal.  Arguably, short gaps in observation due to weather, darkness or other such 
factors are acceptable, as is stopping to pick up evidence (ie a dory from illegal 
fishing). As long as the pursuing vessel can continue with the pursuit and can readily 
identify the offending vessel, the pursuit should be considered to be uninterrupted.  
 
Longer periods of a loss of visual or radar contact are more problematic. There is also 
no international consensus on the length of time or even how long a pursuit can be 
maintained. Indeed pursuit of the Viarsa continued for 21 days or almost 4000 n. 
miles.   
 
 
Challenges for coastal States in the practice of hot pursuit in modern 
international fisheries  
 
Entering third State territorial waters 
 
The entry of the pursued vessel into the territorial waters of its own or a third neutral 
State will bring the pursuit to an end.  The signing of a bilateral treaty between 
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Australia and France on cooperative surveillance with respect to Southern Ocean 
maritime zones specifically addresses this issue.
56
  Under the terms of the Treaty each 
State has prior authorisation to continue a hot pursuit through the territorial sea of the 
other State, provided the other party is informed and no physical law enforcement or 
other coercive action is taken against the vessel pursued whilst in territorial waters.
57
 
 
The provision in Article 111 is consistent with Article 2 the LOSC in that a coastal 
State‟s sovereignty extends to the territorial sea. Vessels have the right of innocent 
passage through third State territorial seas, however enforcement action by a pursuing 
State‟s vessel, such as continuing a hot pursuit, would be contrary to the right of 
innocent passage. 
 
Accepting that premise, it would also be contrary to innocent passage for the pursued 
vessel to loiter within the territorial seas of a third State, for the LOSC requires 
passage to be continuous and expeditious.
58
 It could be argued that the pursuit can 
recommence once the vessel re-enters the high seas after sailing into the territorial 
waters of another State. Poulantzas has argued that it is appropriate to recommence 
hot pursuit in situations whereby the offending vessel has had a short stay or passage 
through the territorial waters with the intent to evade the law.
59
 The intent of entering 
the territorial waters of another State is not „innocent‟, and hence the right of 
„innocent passage‟ should not be used as a shield. Another author has stated that if 
this were to be the position at international law, the offending vessel would be 
„washed clean of its sins by the territorial waters of a third state‟.60 
 
Following the arrest of the Lena in 2002, Australian Fisheries Officers uncovered 
evidence of instructions the vessel received whilst under hot pursuit, as to how the 
pursuit might be negated under international law by entering nearby French waters.
61
  
Evidence discovered after the boarding of the South Tomi in 2001 suggested similar 
information was provided by the vessels‟ owners to the Captain during the pursuit.62 
These two examples support the case that illegal fishing vessels should be denied the 
protection provided by Article 111 where entry into a third State‟s territorial sea has 
been a deliberate act to avoid apprehension.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
 
Colombos argues that the reasoning behind the UNCLOS rationale for cessation as 
opposed to suspension of hot pursuit is to prevent the pursuing ship form lying in wait 
outside territorial waters with the object of resuming the pursuit when the pursued 
ship emerges. Such resumption appears undesirable as it prolongs a right, which ought 
to be exceptional, and is a narrow derogation from the general rule prohibiting any 
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interference by a State with foreign vessels on the high seas.
63
 This argument holds 
less weight in the modern era of illegal fishing.  
 
There is nothing under Article 111 to prevent coastal States permitting third states to 
continue a pursuit through its territorial sea. This is what Australia and France have 
agreed through the 2003
64
 and 2007 bilateral Treaties.  Hence any challenge to the 
legitimacy of a pursuit continued by Australia through the French Southern Ocean 
EEZ (say off Kerguelan Isles) would be presumably answered by producing evidence 
of the Treaty and the consent of France for the right to continue to be exercised.  
 
Co-operative hot pursuit/ third State assistance  
 
The LOSC already recognises that a ship can take over from an aircraft in conducting 
a hot pursuit,
65
 and it has been argued that although not specifically mentioned, it 
would be “both unreasonable and illogical” to reject the notion that a ship can take 
over from another ship.
66
   This is what occurred in the 1929 pursuit of the Canadian 
ship the I’m Alone by an American vessel. The pursuit was commenced by one vessel 
and ended by a second U.S. vessel entering the pursuit from another direction.
67
  
 
If the international community has accepted that a pursuit by one vessel can be ended 
by a second, then it is argued that assistance through third State involvement should 
be equally valid. The ILC recognised that more than one vessel can be used in a hot 
pursuit. Commenting on the exercise of the right in 1957, the ILC stated: 
 
The ship finally arresting the ship pursued need not necessarily be the same as 
the one which began the pursuit, provided that it has joined in the pursuit and 
has not merely effected an interception.
68
  
 
There have been instances of co-operative hot pursuit in recent years. Australia has 
been involved in two high profile Southern Ocean pursuits. Whilst the LOSC does not 
address the possibility of third party assistance in bring the pursuit to a conclusion,
69
 
perhaps it can be argued that to read limitations into the wording unduly fetters the 
ability of coastal States to address the problem of emboldened illegal fishers. Pursuits 
of over 3000 n. miles would not have been envisaged in 1958 and they are hardly the 
norm today. Why should the coastal State be prevented from using a second platform 
from which to effect the arrest, provided the pursuit is still on foot?     
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The South Tomi   was pursued for 14 days across the Southern Ocean in April 2001 
after being detected fishing within the Heard and McDonald Islands‟ fishing zone. 
The vessel initially tracked towards Perth as ordered, however, once it was clear of 
the Australian EEZ, it altered its course and steamed due west. The Southern 
Supporter, a civilian manned vessel with no fire power was unable to force the South 
Tomi to stop.  The pursuit was successfully brought to an end with the aid of the 
South African government through the provision of military vessels manned by 
Australian personnel.
70
 The Southern Supporter was present throughout the whole 
pursuit so the arrival of the South African vessel cannot be viewed as an 
„interruption‟.   
 
Similarly the pursuit of the Viarsa in 2003 involved the assistance of South African 
and British vessels.
71
 This pursuit continued for 21 days across the Southern Ocean to 
waters south west of Cape Town, South Africa.  The Southern Supporter maintained 
the pursuit throughout this time.   
 
It is submitted that although novel, these two instances of multi-lateral hot pursuit do 
not undermine the principle of hot pursuit. Rather they illustrate the adaptation of 
State practice to an evolving environment and in recognising their validity, hot pursuit 
remains a cogent right in the 21
st
 century.     
 
The 2007 Treaty between Australia and France extends the current state of 
international law. It provides that an authorised vessel of one State can take over the 
pursuit commenced by an authorised vessel of the other State.
72
 Whether this 
extension of international law is valid is uncertain. It would be expected that as a 
minimum the coastal State vessel maintain its role in the pursuit.  
 
Shiprider agreements, have been used successfully in criminal law enforcement in 
maritime zones. The existing arrangements between Jamaica and the U.S.A are a 
helpful illustration.
73
   Shiprider agreements allow cooperation in vessel boarding, 
riding and overflight. They typically allow an officer of one State to operate from 
foreign government vessels in boarding suspected offenders.  Multi-lateral hot pursuit 
is conducted on the same premise.    
 
Interruption 
 
During the trial of the five accused fishers on board the Viarsa , defence counsel  
submitted that the hot pursuit was terminated or interrupted when the master of the 
Southern Supporter decided not to pursue the Viarsa into the dangerous ice pack.
74
  
The Southern Supporter lost visual contact of the fleeing Viarsa  however tracked the 
vessel on radar and recommenced the pursuit when she emerged from the ice. In such 
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instances where there has been a deliberate attempt to shake off a pursuing vessel, yet 
the fleeing vessel has been tracked on radar equipment, can a valid argument be made 
that there has been an interruption? A loss of visual, but not radar contact, should not 
constitute an interruption in the conduct of modern fisheries law. To acknowledge the 
usefulness and legitimacy of vessel monitoring systems used to track vessel 
movements (and hence assist with fisheries management), yet deny radar surveillance 
an equally legitimate role, is contradictory.  
 
As noted above, when pursuing the Lena in late 2001, the Australian fisheries patrol 
vessel was forced to break off the pursuit to attend a nearby SOS call, a call which 
was later shown to be false when no vessel in distress could be located.
75
 The patrol 
vessel was unable to relocate the Lena on that occasion (although the vessel was 
apprehended in 2002) and the pursuit was (it is alleged) successfully broken by the 
actions of the Lena’s Captain.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The State practice reviewed in this paper does not upset the balance struck at 
UNCLOSIII between coastal States and vessel owners. The fundamentals of the right 
of hot pursuit have still been observed. Indeed to restrict the ability of  a coastal State 
to use modern technology such as radio broadcasts to signal an order to stop or 
bilateral treaties to deal with the entry to third State territorial seas, would do far more 
damage to the balance.    
 
As an aside, it is submitted that the adaptation of the exercise of hot pursuit to fit 21
st
 
century circumstances should not be linked to other coastal State initiatives to address 
maritime security concerns related to terrorism threats.  This is because these 
initiatives,
76
 which are largely a response to terrorism, raise legitimate issues at 
international law including the creep of coastal State jurisdiction. Adapting hot pursuit 
rights to meet the modern era (such as using radio signals to communicate in a world 
of email, texting, faxing, blogging and satellite communications) is simply ensuring 
the right remains relevant.   
 
The right of hot pursuit is firmly anchored in international law. However its exercise 
should not be weighed down to the same extent. It has been adapted by State practice 
to meet the evolved nature of modern marine fisheries and the increasingly bold 
practices of illegal fishers. To restrict its development would be to signal to illegal 
fishers (and their corporate backers) that coastal States are limited in their ability to 
exercise their rights. 
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